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Social networks influence individuals in a myriad of ways. In countries where markets are either 
missing or may function imperfectly, informal community networks, such as caste-based networks 
in India, provide a range of benefits and services to their members (Munshi and Rosenzweig 2006; 
Munshi 2014). However, in traditional patriarchal societies, women may have limited ability to 
access and benefit from existing networks due to restrictive social norms and strategic constraints 
that are imposed on them by their family members. In this article, we characterize the social 
networks of young married women in rural Uttar Pradesh1—a north Indian state where patrilocality 
is the norm and women have extremely low levels of empowerment (Malhotra et al., 1995; Duflo 
2012; Jayachandran 2015). We then analyze how inter-generational power dynamics within the 
marital household affect their ability to access and form social networks. We find that women in 
our study setting have remarkably few social connections outside their homes, and co-residence 
with the mother-in-law (MIL) is a significant barrier to a woman’s mobility and ability to tap into 
her caste-based village networks, resulting in detrimental impacts on her access and utilization of 
reproductive health services.  
   We collected primary data on the social networks of 18-30-year-old married women in 
Jaunpur district, Uttar Pradesh, in 2018. We find that women in our sample are quite isolated—
besides her husband and MIL, an average woman interacts with 1.6 individuals in Jaunpur about 
issues that are important to her (“general peers”) and with 0.7 individuals in Jaunpur about more 
private matters like reproductive health, fertility, and family planning (“close peers”). Nearly 36 
percent of women in our sample have no close peers in Jaunpur, and the modal woman has only 
one close peer in Jaunpur. In fact, the proportion of women in our sample who have no close 
peers anywhere (inside or outside Jaunpur) is also substantial (22 percent). The mobility 
restrictions experienced by our sample women are severe—only 14 percent of the women are 
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allowed to go alone to a health facility and only 12 percent are permitted to visit the homes of 
friends or relatives in their village by themselves. In addition, consistent with other empirical 
evidence from India (e.g., Kandpal and Baylis 2013; Kandpal and Baylis 2019), we find that the 
social network of our sample women displays homophily by caste, gender, marital status, and 
religion.  
We then examine whether co-residence with the MIL influences a daughter-in-law’s 
ability to form social connections outside the home. In patrilocal-patrilineal societies where 
extended households are common, such as India, household members other than the husband can 
play a crucial role in determining a woman’s level of autonomy and well-being.2 Several 
sociological and anthropological studies have found that a woman’s MIL plays an especially 
significant role in shaping her decision-making in such societies (see Gram et al. 2019 for a 
review).3 Arguably, the MIL may be an even stronger influence on a woman than her husband, 
especially during the early years of the arranged marriage. However, the extent to which the MIL 
plays a constraining or supporting role in shaping the social network of her daughter-in-law 
(DIL) is a priori unclear and requires empirical investigation. On the one hand, the MIL may 
restrict the DIL’s social circle aiming to prevent outside influence from deviating the DIL’s 
behavior and outcomes from the MIL’s preferences. On the other hand, co-residence with the 
MIL may enable the DIL to tap into the MIL’s social network, which is likely to be larger and 
more connected, given her age and length of residence in the village. 
We find that, compared to a woman who does not reside with her MIL, a woman who 
lives with her MIL has 18 percent fewer close peers in her village with whom she interacts about 
issues related to health, fertility, and family planning and has 36 percent fewer such peers outside 
the home (i.e., “close outside peers”). Our estimates suggest that the MIL restricts her DIL’s 
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social network by not permitting her to visit places outside the home alone, potentially to control 
the DIL’s fertility and family planning behavior. The negative relationship between MIL-co-
residence and DIL’s number of close outside peers is stronger if the MIL does not approve of 
family planning, if she wants more children than the DIL desires, and if she wants her DIL to 
have more sons than she already has. These findings suggest that the MIL’s restrictive behavior 
is ultimately driven by her preferences and attitudes about fertility and family planning. 
The restrictions that are imposed by the MIL on her DIL’s access to social networks can 
potentially have significant detrimental impacts on the DIL. In our setting, women who have 
fewer close outside peers are less likely to visit health facilities to receive reproductive health, 
fertility, or family planning services, and are less likely to use modern contraceptive methods. 
Indeed, we perform mediation analysis to show that the DIL’s number of close outside peers is 
an important mechanism through which a DIL’s co-residence with her MIL alters her family 
planning outcomes.  
In addition, we adopt an instrumental variables (IV) strategy to identify the causal effect 
of close outside peers on a woman’s family planning outcomes. We instrument a woman’s 
number of close peers outside the household with the interaction of two variables: 1) the 
proportion of married women in a woman’s village who belong to her caste group and 2) an 
indicator for whether a woman co-resides with her MIL. We use the former as a proxy for the 
pool of individuals from which a woman’s outside peers can be drawn since social interactions in 
India tend to be gender- and caste-based—this has been argued in previous literature (Hoff and 
Pandey 2006; Munshi and Rosenzweig 2006; Mukherjee 2017; Kandpal and Baylis 2019) and is 
demonstrated by our data. Thus, the interaction IV seeks to capture the negative effect of the 
MIL on women’s access to the pool of potential close peers in her village. In our preferred 
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regression specification, we control for women’s socio-economic characteristics and for village-
by-caste group fixed effects, thereby leveraging the variation in MIL-co-residence among 
women who belong to the same caste-group in the same village for the first-stage of the IV 
analysis. We conduct several robustness checks and placebo tests to support the validity of our 
instrument and to address the potential selection into co-residence with the MIL. 
 Our IV estimates imply that having an additional close outside peer increases a woman’s 
likelihood of visiting a family planning clinic by 67 percentage points (p.p.), relative to the 30 
percent probability among women who do not have any close outside peers in their village. 
Similarly, an additional close outside peer increases a woman’s likelihood of using modern 
contraceptive methods by 11 p.p., relative to the 16 percent probability among women who do 
not have a close outside peer in their village—although the magnitude of this effect is sizable, it 
is not statistically significant at conventional levels. We present suggestive evidence that the peer 
effects underlying these IV results operate through at least two channels: information diffusion 
and peer support through companionship. First, women who have more close outside peers 
believe that a larger proportion of women in their village are using family planning, suggesting 
that peers affect women’s beliefs about the social acceptability of family planning. This 
mechanism is consistent with prior evidence on the role of social networks in information 
diffusion.4 Second, a woman’s close outside peers accompany her to seek care at a family 
planning clinic, thereby enabling her to overcome the mobility constraints that are imposed on 
her by the MIL.  
 Our paper makes several important contributions to the literature in family economics as 
well as to the economics of networks in developing countries. Although collective models of 
household behavior have recognized the importance of interactions among family members in 
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determining individual welfare (see Chiappori and Mazzocco 2017, and the studies cited 
therein), this literature has primarily focused on bargaining between husbands and wives, and 
that too predominantly within a nuclear household structure. Therefore, the role and the 
influence of household members other than the husband on women’s welfare has largely been 
ignored in economics. However, several descriptive studies in other disciplines, mostly in the 
South Asian context, where arranged marriage and patrilocality are the norm, have documented 
the significant role of the MIL in affecting women’s autonomy. The bulk of this work finds a 
negative correlation between female autonomy and the presence of the MIL in the household 
(Cain, Khanam, and Nahar 1979; Jejeebhoy 1991; Bloom, Wypij, and Gupta 2001; Jejeebhoy 
and Sathar 2001; Gram et al. 2018), except for some studies that have found that living with the 
MIL can also be beneficial for women in some dimensions, such as health during pregnancy 
(Allendorf 2006; Varghese and Roy 2019).5 To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study 
to explore the influence of the MIL on the formation of women’s social networks and the 
resulting effects on their access to health services, care-seeking behavior, and health outcomes. 
While previous research has shown that disagreements between spouses on desired fertility can 
affect contraceptive use (Ashraf, Field, and Lee 2014; McCarthy 2019), we demonstrate that the 
misalignment of fertility preferences between the MIL and the DIL may also be a crucial 
determinant of the DIL’s family planning outcomes.  
More broadly, despite rapid growth in research on social networks in economics (Jackson 
2007; Jackson 2008; Jackson 2014; Breza 2016; Jackson, Rogers, and Zenou 2016; Banerjee et 
al. 2019), the literature on the role of gender in network formation and peer effects is relatively 
limited, especially in developing country contexts. We contribute to this literature in several 
ways. First, through our primary data collection effort, we characterize women’s networks in the 
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domain of reproductive health, which have not received much attention in prior research. Given 
the private nature of interactions about fertility and family planning, the members of such 
networks are potentially the most influential, and hence the most policy-relevant, peers or 
individuals for young married women in settings such as ours.  
Second,  we add to the literature on the role of peers in affecting women’s well-being in 
developing countries by focusing on a new set of outcomes—utilization of reproductive health 
services and modern contraceptive use; prior work has examined peer effects in the adoption of 
new women’s health technology (Oster and Thornton 2012), female entrepreneurship (Field et al. 
2016), job referrals (Beaman, Keleher, and Magruder 2018), freedom of movement, and 
investments in children (Kandpal and Baylis 2019). Furthermore, our finding that women have 
few outside peers with whom they discuss private matters also contributes to the narrow set of 
studies that examine the consequences of women’s social isolation, for instance, on female 
empowerment (Kandpal and Baylis (2019) in India) and agricultural technology adoption 
(Beaman and Dillon (2018) in Mali).  
Finally, as was previously mentioned, we are the first to examine how co-residence with 
the MIL influences the formation of her DIL’s social network and thereby prevents her from 
experiencing beneficial peer effects. In this manner, we highlight an under-appreciated 
explanation for the relative sparsity of women’s social networks in contexts where patrilocality 
and restrictive social norms are prominent. 
Data  
The data that we use in this study is from a household survey that we designed to specifically 
characterize the social networks of young married women in Uttar Pradesh, India. The household 
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survey is the baseline wave of a randomized controlled trial that aimed to increase women’s 
access to family planning services.6 Therefore, our sample is comprised of women who were 
currently married, were aged 18 to 30, had at least one living child, were not sterilized nor had 
had a hysterectomy, and were neither currently pregnant nor more than six months post-partum 
at the time we conducted the baseline survey. These inclusion criteria were chosen to identify a 
sample of young married women of reproductive ages, with a potential unmet need for family 
planning, and for whom we believe that a family planning intervention would be appropriate and 
effective. We excluded married women who had not begun childbearing from our study due to 
the presence of cultural norms that dictate that newly married couples should prove their fertility 
as soon as possible after marriage (Jejeebhoy, Santhya, and Zavier 2014).7  
We conducted a complete household listing in 28 Jaunpur villages that were located 
within a 10-kilometer radius from the family planning clinic that we partnered with for the 
randomized experiment. Our fieldwork team screened a total of 2,781 households and a total of 
698 households were identified to have at least one eligible woman. We contacted the youngest 
eligible woman from each of these households; a total of 671 eligible women consented to 
participate in the study and were administered the baseline survey between June and August in 
2018.  
To map the social network of our sample women, we first asked each of them to name up 
to five individuals in Jaunpur, besides her husband and her MIL, with whom she discusses her 
personal affairs related to issues such as children’s illness, schooling, health, work, and financial 
support. We call these individuals her “general peers.” We then asked each woman to name up 
to five individuals in Jaunpur with whom she discusses issues around family planning, fertility, 
and reproductive health; we name these individuals her “close peers.” 8,9 We collected detailed 
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socio-economic, demographic, family planning related, and network related information (e.g., 
measures of trust and connectedness) from the surveyed woman for each of her close peers in 
Jaunpur.10 We also asked about her interactions with her husband, with her MIL, and with other 
close peers outside Jaunpur.  
As part of the survey, we also collected information on women’s socio-economic 
characteristics, birth history, marriage, fertility preferences, decision-making, and freedom of 
movement. Our survey instrument also gathered data on health services utilization in which we 
asked each woman about her access to health clinics, including whether she has ever visited a 
health clinic; the distance and the travel-time to the closest clinic; and whether she goes to the 
clinic with others (such as, relatives and friends). 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the main variables used in our empirical analysis. 
Our sample women are predominantly from lower castes, with 43 percent belonging to a 
Scheduled Caste (SC) and 44 percent belonging to Other Backward Classes (OBC). Over 67 
percent of the sample women live with the MIL and the average marital duration is seven years. 
The lack of women’s mobility in our study area is striking: less than 20 percent of women are 
allowed to go alone to the market, to a health facility, or to the homes of friends or relatives in 
the village. Moreover, only 14 percent of the women worked in the last seven days and 88 
percent practice ghunghat or purdah, both of which reflect the conservative norms that are 
practiced within our study area. Lastly, 18 percent of the women were using a modern 
contraceptive method at the time of the survey and 35 percent of them had visited a health 
facility for reproductive health, fertility, or family planning services at some point in their lives.  
Characterization of Women’s Social Networks 
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We find that young married women in rural Uttar Pradesh interact with very few individuals, 
besides their husbands and mothers-in-law, about their personal affairs or private concerns. An 
average woman in our sample mentions 1.6 general peers in Jaunpur district. About 9 percent of 
women have no such peers; 40 percent of women mention one person, and 33 percent of women 
mention two people. Women’s interactions with others are even more limited within the domains 
of family planning, fertility, and reproductive health. Nearly 36 percent of women speak to no one 
in Jaunpur district, besides their husband and MIL, about these issues. The modal woman has 
only one such close peer, and the proportion of women in our sample who have no close peers 
anywhere (inside or outside Jaunpur) is also substantial (22 percent).  
Most (86 percent) of women’s close peers in Jaunpur are relatives. The average duration 
of a woman’s close-peer relationships in Jaunpur is highly correlated with her marital duration, 
which is consistent with the fact that most women in our sample moved to their marital villages 
from elsewhere after their marriage. Almost 60 percent of the close-peer relationships in Jaunpur 
were formed more than 5 years ago, and 62 percent of the women report talking with their close 
peers every day, while 27 percent of them talk with their close peers every other week. 
Furthermore, 58 percent of the women reported that they would feel very comfortable leaving 
their children for an afternoon with their close peers, while 50 percent of them reported having 
discussed marital problems and intra-household conflicts with their close peers. Thus, women’s 
social networks in our context are strongly embedded within their extended households, which is 
not surprising given the severe mobility constraints that they face. These results are consistent 
with the evidence from other contexts indicating that women’s networks tend to be comprised of 
a larger proportion of kin-ties compared to men’s networks (Fischer and Oliker 1983; Moore 
1990; Gillespie et al. 2015).  
Curse of the Mummy-ji 
 11 
If we narrow our focus geographically to the woman’s village, an average woman has 
only 0.55 close peers in her village, roughly half of whom live in her household while the other 
half live outside her household.11 Only 49 percent of the women have at least one close peer in 
their respective villages, and the proportion of women who have such a close peer outside her 
household is even smaller (24 percent). Thus, our sample women have severely limited 
interaction with people outside their homes.  
Our results are similar to the evidence in Kandpal and Baylis (2019), who find that a 
modal woman in Uttarakhand, a neighboring state of Uttar Pradesh, has on average three friends 
who live outside her household.12 Similarly, Magnan et al. (2015) find low levels of social 
connectivity in agriculture among women and men in three districts of northeastern Uttar 
Pradesh. In contrast, an average woman in the United States reported having eight close friends 
in a 2004 Gallup poll (Gallup Inc 2004), while in a more recent global study of 10,000 male and 
female participants from Australia, France, Germany, India, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, the United 
Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the average person reported having 
4.3 close friends and more than 20 distant friends or acquaintances (Protein Inc. Study 2019). 
Consistent with previous evidence on social networks in India (Munshi and Rosenzweig 
2006, Banerjee et al. 2013; Jackson 2014), we find that the social network of women in our 
sample displays caste-homophily: 94 percent of a woman’s close peers in Jaunpur are of the same 
caste. Moreover, we observe homophily in terms of gender, marital status, and religion: almost all 
of the close peers are women; 90 percent of them are married; and all of them are from the same 
religion. These findings reflect the strong homophilous ties that are typically observed within 
women’s social networks and which have been observed in other contexts (Brashears 2008). 
Nonetheless, we also note that women in our sample differ from their close peers in Jaunpur in 
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terms of age, education, and economic status. For instance, close peers appear to be older; the 
average age of these peers is 30; and 40 percent of them are older than 30. This may be due in part 
to the design of our survey, given that we selected the youngest eligible woman from our sampled 
households to participate. Only 26 percent of the close peers were reported to have the same level 
of education as the sample woman, while 50 percent of close peers were reported to be more 
educated. Lastly, our sample women reported that 75 percent of their close peers have the same 
economic status as them, while 21 percent of the close peers were reported to be economically 
better-off. We note that this social network characterization is based on peer characteristics as 
reported by the surveyed woman, who may have imperfect information on her peers’ age, 
education, and economic status. In this sense, these descriptive statistics capture the perceptions 
of surveyed women about their peers.13  
The Influence of the Mother-in-Law 
We now examine how co-residence with the MIL restricts her DIL’s social network; why and how 
the MIL exerts her influence; and the consequences of these restrictions for the DIL. We begin by 
estimating the correlation between living with the MIL and her DIL’s number of close peers who 
reside in her village. We focus on the number of peers in the same village for various reasons. 
Physical proximity has been shown to be important for developing close friendships or 
relationships as it enables more frequent interactions (Hipp and Perrin 2009; Beaman and Dillon 
2018). Moreover, for outcomes such as mobility and access to health services, a woman’s peers 
who live in the same village are likely to be more relevant than her peers who live outside the 
village since the former can more easily offer companionship and support. Lastly, given that 
mobile phone ownership among women in India is generally low—only 33 percent of women own 
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mobile phones (Barboni et al. 2018)—women’s interactions with long-distance peers are limited, 
making peers who live in the same village even more relevant.  
We estimate the following OLS specification for a woman 𝑖 from caste-group 𝑐 living in 
village 𝑣: 
(1)            𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑣 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑖 + 𝑿𝑖
′𝜸 + 𝜃𝑣 + 𝜃𝑐 +  𝑖𝑐𝑣 
 
The variable 𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑣 denotes the outcome of interest; 𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑖 is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the woman’s MIL lives in the same household as her; 𝑿𝑖 is a vector of individual-level 
controls that includes the woman’s age and years of education, an indicator for her being Hindu, 
and the amount of land her household owns.14 We also control for indicators for caste category 
(SC-ST, OBC, Upper caste), 𝜃𝑐, and include village fixed effects (𝜃𝑣). We use heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors to make inference and cluster standard errors at the village level.  
Column (1) in Panel A of Table 2 shows that co-residence with the MIL is significantly 
negatively associated with the number of close peers that a woman has in her village. The 
coefficient of -0.120 implies that a woman who lives with her MIL has, on average, 20 percent 
fewer close peers in her village than a woman who does not reside with her MIL. The negative 
influence of MIL-co-residence on the number of a woman’s close peers outside her household, but 
in the same village, is even larger. The coefficient of -0.133 in column (1) of Panel B in Table 2 
suggests that a woman who co-resides with her MIL has 37 percent fewer close peers outside her 
household relative to a woman who does not reside with her MIL.  
Columns (2) – (5) of Table 2 demonstrate that the influence of the MIL on her DIL is 
significantly larger and more negative relative to the influence of other household members. Co-
residence with the father-in-law is not significantly correlated with a woman’s number of close 
peers inside or outside the household. The presence of other adult women in the household (for 
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example, sisters-in-law) is positively correlated with a woman’s number of close peers in the 
village but not with her number of close peers outside the household. This finding implies that 
although the presence of these more proximate women expands the pool of individuals with whom 
a woman can discuss private matters within the household, it does not result in more outside 
peers.15 This suggests that a woman’s sisters-in-law may also be affected by the dominant position 
of the MIL.16 
Exploring plausible explanations for the results in Table 2, we find that the MIL may 
prevent her DIL from forming social connections by imposing constraints on her mobility. 
Although the ability to access spaces outside the home is low even for women who do not live 
with their MIL, those who reside with their MIL fare much worse in terms of their freedom of 
movement. Table 3 (using specification (1)) shows that co-residence with MIL is significantly 
negatively correlated with women’s physical mobility. For instance, a woman who lives with her 
MIL is 9.6 p.p., or 44 percent less likely to be allowed to visit the homes of relatives or friends in 
the village or neighborhood alone, relative to a woman who does not reside with her MIL. 
Similarly, a woman who lives with her MIL is 53 percent less likely to be permitted to visit a 
health facility alone than a comparable woman who does not live with her MIL. The pattern is 
similar for mobility restrictions on visiting alone other places outside the home, such as, the 
market, the grocery store, and places outside the village or community. These results are 
consistent with our previous finding that the negative influence of living with the MIL on a 
woman’s number of close peers in her village is even greater if we examine such peers who live 
outside the woman’s home (37 percent versus 20 percent in Table 2).  
We acknowledge that our results in Tables 2 and 3, although strong and statistically 
significant, are correlations and may not identify the true causal effect of co-residence with the 
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MIL. Our 𝛽 estimates will be biased if there is selection into living with the MIL, i.e., if women 
who live with the MIL are different from women who do not live with the MIL in terms of 
characteristics that are correlated with our outcomes of interest. For instance, if women whose 
husbands are more conservative are more likely to live with their parents-in-law, then such 
women would have fewer close peers and have lower mobility even in the absence of living with 
the MIL. In Table 4, we explicitly compare the observable socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics of women who live with their MIL with those who do not live with their MIL. 
These two types of women do not have statistically significant differences in terms of caste, 
religion, husband age, employment status, the spousal gap in educational attainment, the amount 
of land owned by the household, and the number of living sons. However, women who live with 
their MIL are younger, have been married for a shorter duration, and are more educated than 
those who do not live with their MIL. On the one hand, the bias due to the differences in age and 
marital duration is likely be in the same direction as our results in Tables 2 and 3 as younger 
women and women who have lived in their village for a shorter duration are likely to have fewer 
social connections irrespective of their co-residence with the MIL. On the other hand, the 
differences in educational attainment are likely to bias us against finding a negative effect on the 
number of close outside peers if more educated women enjoy greater autonomy irrespective of 
living with the MIL. Thus, a priori, the direction of selection bias is unclear. To address the 
potential bias due to these observable differences, we control for women’s age and education in 
our specifications. 
An additional source of statistical endogeneity may be reverse causality; e.g., the DIL’s 
family planning use may lead to conflict with the MIL if the latter disapproves of family 
planning, resulting in the DIL and her husband moving out of the joint family. Based on our 
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understanding of the context, this is unlikely to be a major concern. Co-residence with the MIL is 
typically determined at the time of the arranged marriage, which precedes the DIL’s family 
planning choices. The dissolution of joint families mainly occurs due to the death of the patriarch 
(Caldwell, Reddy, & Caldwell 1984; Khuda 1985; Foster 1993; Debnath 2015), or because of 
discord among sub-households over income-pooling when the relative contributions are 
disproportionate, or due to migration for work. The DIL’s family planning use is unlikely to 
cause partition of joint families. Moreover, contraceptive use before marriage is negligible in our 
study setting and, hence, we do not expect it to influence a woman’s marriage market outcomes.  
Although it is difficult to establish causality without a credible source of exogenous 
variation in co-residence with the MIL, we present two pieces of evidence to address the 
potential sources of bias in our OLS estimates. First, as Table 5 shows, our findings remain 
qualitatively similar if we restrict the sample to households where the father-in-law is a member 
of the household. Since divorce is highly unlikely in our context, especially among older 
generations, the absence of MIL in households where the father-in-law is present is almost 
certainly due to her death, a likely exogenous event. Thus, the coefficients of  𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑖 in Table 5 
are potentially closer to the true causal impact of co-residence with the MIL than those in Tables 
2 and 3. The negative association between a woman’s number of close outside peers and co-
residence with her MIL in Table 5 is even stronger than what we observe in Table 2, 
demonstrating that any potential selection-bias makes us underestimate the true effect of the MIL 
on her DIL’s number of close outside peers in Table 2. Second, our sample comprises of 
relatively young (18-30-year-old) women, who are unlikely to have a choice in whether or not to 
live with the parents-in-law, particularly during the early years of their marriage. The decision to 
leave the extended household is typically made by the couple several years after marriage. In 
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column (1) of Online Supplementary Appendix Table A.3, we confirm that our results hold when 
we restrict the sample to women who have been married for no more than five years; co-
residence with the MIL is more likely to be exogenous for these women.    
In order to understand why the MIL may restrict her DIL’s interactions with outsiders 
about matters related to health, fertility, and family planning, we examine the heterogeneity in 
our previous results by the MIL’s preferences and attitudes about fertility and family planning. 
As we show in Table 6, the negative influence of the MIL on her DIL’s number of close peers is 
stronger, both in magnitude and in significance, when she disapproves of family planning 
(columns 1-2)), when her ideal number of children for her DIL is larger than the DIL’s own ideal 
number of children (columns 3-4)), and when she desires more sons for the DIL than the DIL’s 
current number of living sons (columns 5-6)). This heterogeneity suggests that the MIL fears that 
outside influence may cause her DIL’s fertility outcomes and family planning use to deviate 
from her, i.e., the MIL’s, preferences. In fact, among the sample of women whose mothers-in-
law disapprove of family planning, 71 percent believe that this is because the MIL wants them to 
have (more) children—this is by far the most cited reason, followed by 25 percent of women 
who believe that their MIL is worried about the side effects from using contraceptive methods. 
Moreover, Online Supplementary Appendix Table A.3 demonstrates that the negative correlation 
between MIL-co-residence and her DIL’s outside connections is larger when her son (i.e., the 
DIL’s husband) also disapproves of family planning (columns (3)-(4)) and when he is a migrant, 
i.e., has been away from home for one month or more at a time (columns (5)-(6)). These findings 
imply that the MIL’s authority is even stronger when the woman’s husband is often away from 
home and when his family planning attitudes are aligned with those of his mother.   
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In Table 7, we find that women who have fewer close outside peers in their village are 
significantly less likely to have ever visited a health facility for reproductive health, fertility, or 
family planning services (column (1)). They are also less likely to use a modern method of 
contraception (column (2)). Thus, the mobility restrictions imposed by the MIL, and the 
subsequently fewer number of close peers that her DIL has, might have additional significant 
detrimental impacts on her DIL in terms of her access to health clinics and contraceptive choices.  
 
Mediation Analysis 
Our results so far have shown two main patterns: (1) women who live with their mothers-in-law 
have fewer close social connections outside the home than those who do not, and (2) women 
who have fewer close outside connections are less likely to visit a family planning clinic and 
have lower modern contraceptive use than those who have more such connections. In this 
section, we perform mediation analysis to assess whether a woman’s number of close outside 
peers (𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖) is a likely mechanism through which co-residence with her MIL alters her 
family planning outcomes.  
Figure 1 demonstrates the probable causal pathways between our variables of interest. A 
MIL can potentially affect her DIL’s family planning outcomes (a) directly, (b) indirectly via our 
mediator of interest, 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖, and (c) indirectly via other mediators, such as mobility 
constraints that are imposed on the DIL. To test whether 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 is a relevant mediator, we 
use sequential g-estimation, a methodological approach proposed by Acharya et al. (2016) that 
relies upon a comparison of the average total effect (ATE) of MIL-co-residence with the 
estimated average controlled direct effect (ACDE) of MIL-co-residence that does not operate 
through the mediator of interest, 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖. 
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The ATE is equal to the estimated coefficient 𝛽 in equation (1). The ACDE is estimated 
using a two-step method proposed by Acharya et al. (2016). In the first step, we regress the 
outcome of interest (𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑣) on the treatment (𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑖), the mediator (𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖), pre-treatment 
covariates, post-treatment covariates, and intermediate confounders:  
(2)           𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑣 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 ⋅ 𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑖 + 𝑐 ⋅ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝒁𝑖
′𝒅 + 𝑿𝒊
′𝒆 + 𝑲𝑖
′𝒇 + 𝜃𝑣 + 𝜃𝑐 + 𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑣 
The vector 𝒁 denotes intermediate confounders that are likely affected by MIL-co-residence and 
that potentially also affect both 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 and the outcome, 𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑣. In our analysis, 𝒁 is 
comprised of two variables: an index of DIL’s mobility and an index of DIL’s decision-making 
autonomy related to her health and her visits to family and relatives.17 The vector 𝑿 includes pre-
treatment covariates, i.e., woman’s age, and indicators for woman’s years of education and for 
being Hindu. The vector 𝑲 denotes post-treatment covariates, i.e., the amount of land that is 
owned by the household.18  
In the second step, we regress a de-mediated version of the predicted outcome (?̃?𝑖𝑐𝑣) on 
the treatment and pre-treatment covariates. 
(3)                ?̃?𝑖𝑐𝑣 = 𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑣 − ?̂? ⋅ 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖                                                
(4)                ?̃?𝑖𝑐𝑣 = 𝑔 + 𝒉 ⋅ 𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑖 + 𝑿𝑖
′𝒎 + 𝑲𝑖
′𝒏 +  𝜃𝑣 + 𝜃𝑐 + 𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑣  
The coefficient ℎ measures the ACDE of MIL-co-residence that does not operate through 
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖. The difference between the ATE (𝛽) and the ACDE (ℎ) captures the extent to 
which 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 is a mediating mechanism through which MIL-co-residence affects the 
outcomes of interest.  
Table 8 presents the estimated ATE and ACDE of co-residence with the MIL on four 
outcomes of interest: i) the woman’s likelihood of visiting a family planning clinic, ii) the 
woman’s modern contraceptive use, iii) the woman’s beliefs about family planning use in her 
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village, and iv) whether the woman visited a health facility with someone. In columns (1) and 
(2), we estimate the ATE and ACDE of co-residence with the MIL on the outcome of interest, 
while column (3) shows the difference between these two estimates. In columns (4) to (6), we 
present the same estimates but from specifications that also control for caste-by-village fixed 
effects. Since the second-stage regression in equation (4) has an estimated variable nested within 
it, we use bootstrapping to calculate unbiased and consistent standard errors in columns (1) and 
(2).19 We also test whether the difference between the ATE and the ACDE in both specifications 
is statistically different from zero. Panel A shows that the ACDE of MIL-co-residence is 19 
percent to 24 percent smaller, and significantly so, than the ATE of MIL-co-residence on the 
likelihood that the DIL has visited a family planning clinic. Consistently, we also observe 
significant declines of 4 percent and 13 percent in the coefficient of MIL-co-residence when we 
de-mediate the outcomes in Panels C and D, namely the DIL’s beliefs about family planning use 
in the village and her ability to visit a health facility with someone.20  
Thus, our mediation analysis provides suggestive evidence that the number of DIL’s 
close outside peers in the village is a significant channel through which MIL co-residence acts on 
DIL’s family planning outcomes. We refrain from making a causal claim here since we lack 
quantitative data for an exogenous source of variation in MIL-co-residence.21  
Instrumental Variables Estimation 
In this section, we attempt to explicitly estimate the causal effect of close outside peers on 
women’s family planning outcomes.  The estimates in Table 7 may not capture the causal effect 
of close outside peers as women who have more such peers may be more likely to visit health 
clinics and to use modern contraception for reasons other than peer effects. Therefore, we adopt 
an instrumental variables (IV) approach to causally estimate the coefficients of interest. 
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Our mediation analysis suggests that MIL-co-residence, 𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑖, may be a potentially 
relevant instrument for the DIL’s number of close outside peers. However, 𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑖 may not satisfy 
the exclusion restriction if women who co-reside with the MIL are different in terms of 
unobservable characteristics than women who do not co-reside with the MIL, or if MIL co-
residence directly affects the outcomes or affects the outcomes through channels other than the 
number of close outside peers. Therefore, we interact 𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑖 with the fraction of women in woman 
i’s village v who belong to her caste group c (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑣)
22 and use this interaction as an instrument 
for woman i’s number of close outside peers in her village. As we discuss later in this section, 
the interaction instrument (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑣 ⋅ 𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑖) is more likely to satisfy the exclusion restriction than 
𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑖 alone. Then, we estimate the following two-stage least squares (2SLS) model:  
(5)                 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑣 = 𝜇 + 𝛿(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑣 ⋅ 𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑖) + 𝑿𝑖
′𝝉 + 𝜂𝑐 + 𝜂𝑣 + 𝜂𝑐𝑣 + 𝜈𝑖𝑐𝑣  
(6)                         𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑣 = 𝜋 + 𝜙 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑣̂ + 𝑿𝑖
′𝝋 + 𝜆𝑐 + 𝜆𝑣 + 𝜆𝑐𝑣 + 𝑢𝑖𝑐𝑣  
The variable 𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑣 is the outcome of interest (e.g., the likelihood of visiting a family 
planning clinic) and ClosePeersicv is the number of a woman’s close peers who live outside the 
household in her village v. In the first stage, we exploit the variation in the number of close 
outside peers that is driven by the interaction term, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑣 ⋅ 𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑖 , after controlling for a 
woman’s socio-economic characteristics (Xi) and fixed effects for village (𝜂𝑣), for caste-group 
(𝜂𝑐), and for their interaction (𝜂𝑐𝑣).
23 Subsequently, we use the predicted number of close outside 
peers from the first stage, 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑣,̂  to explain a woman’s outcomes in the second stage.  
The variable 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑣 is a proxy for the available pool or the supply of individuals in the 
village from which a woman’s close outside peers are likely to be drawn. In our preferred 
definition of  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑣, we focus on the pool of 18-30-year-old married women in the village, and 
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calculate the fraction of such women who belong to various caste groups. The exact formula is as 
follows, where 𝑁𝑣
1830,𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑 denotes the total number of married 18-30-year-old women in the 
village and 𝑁𝑐𝑣
1830,𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑 is the number of such women who belong to the caste-group c:  








We define the peer-pool in terms of caste because social networks in India have been 
shown to be predominantly caste based (Hoff and Pandey 2006; Munshi and Rosenzweig 2006; 
Mukherjee 2015; Kandpal and Baylis 2019).24 Moreover, the social norms in our setting are such 
that they prevent young married women from forming peer-relationships with men other than 
their husbands or male kin such as fathers and brothers. Similarly, taboos surrounding 
discussions about conjugal relations imply that unmarried women are less likely to participate in 
interactions about issues such as reproductive health and family planning with married women. 
In fact, as we described in the earlier section, our network exhibits significant homophily by 
caste, gender, and marital status.  We also focus on the 18-30 age group because 60 percent of the 
close peers of our sample women fall within this age range. Nevertheless, we also estimate our 
models by defining the caste-based pool in terms of the number of all 18-30-year-old women in 
the village (i.e., ignoring their marital status) and in terms of the number of all women in the 
village (i.e., ignoring both age and marital status) as robustness checks.25  
The interaction variable, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑣 ⋅ 𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑖, captures the differential effect of the available 
pool in the village on a woman’s number of close outside peers in the village by co-residence 
with the MIL. Through this interaction, we seek to capture the constraints imposed by the MIL 
on her DIL’s access to the pool of available outside peers.26 The village-level fixed-effects 
control for village-specific factors that are correlated with the outcomes and that affect women 
from all castes in the village. For instance, women who live in less populated or more 
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conservative villages may have fewer close outside peers irrespective of co-residence with their 
MIL. Similarly, caste-level fixed-effects incorporate differences across caste groups that are 
common across villages; e.g., if upper-caste families are more conservative, women who belong 
to upper castes may face more severe constraints independently of whether or not they live with 
their MIL. Lastly, in our preferred specification, we allow for caste-by-village fixed effects to 
flexibly control for all factors that vary at the caste-village level and that are correlated with our 
outcomes of interest. We cluster the standard errors at the village level to control for within-
village error correlation. As our sample comprises only 28 villages, in Online Supplementary 
Appendix Table A.5, we show that our inference remains robust to the use of wild-cluster 
bootstrap confidence intervals and corresponding p-values.   
The identifying assumption underlying our IV approach is that, conditional upon Xi and 
the extensive set of fixed effects, our instrument affects the outcomes, such as a woman’s 
likelihood of visiting a family planning clinic, only through her interactions with close outside 
peers. The interaction term, i.e., 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑣 ⋅ 𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑖, allows us to control for caste-by-village fixed 
effects, which implies that the variation in our first-stage is obtained from a comparison of 
women who belong to the same caste group and who live in the same village, but who differ in 
terms of co-residence with the MIL. The exclusion restriction will be violated if there are 
unobservable individual- or household-level differences in women belonging to the same caste-
group and village but who differ in terms of living with the MIL. Earlier, in Table 4, we have 
already shown that co-residence with the MIL does not significantly differ by caste, religion, 
husband age, employment status, the spousal gap in educational attainment, the amount of land 
owned by the household, and the number of living sons. There are some differences in terms of 
woman’s age and education, so we include woman’s age fixed effects and control for woman’s 
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years of schooling in both stages of the 2SLS regressions. Additionally, we control for the 
distance from the woman’s home to the closest health facility as a proxy for household-level 
availability of health services. While it is always difficult to prove that the exclusion restriction is 
never violated, later, we perform a series of robustness checks to further validate our findings.  
For the instrument to be valid, it needs to be strongly correlated with the number of close 
outside peers. Table 9 presents the estimates from the first-stage regression specification (2) 
using the three definitions of the peer-pool that was described earlier. In all columns, the 
coefficient of the interaction term, i.e., of our instrument, is negative and highly significant. In 
columns (1), (3), and (5), we exclude the caste-by-village fixed effects so that we can also 
estimate the main effect of 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑣. We find that if a woman does not live with her MIL, her 
number of close peers outside the household increases with the proportion of women in the 
village that belong to her caste, but living with the MIL decreases the positive effect of 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑣. 
As column (1) shows, when there is no MIL present, a unit (or a 100 percent) increase in 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑣 
(i.e., going from having no other woman from one’s caste group in the village to living in a 
village where all other women belong to one’s caste group), increases the number of close 
outside peers by 0.16. Co-residence with the MIL reduces the influence of the pool on a 
woman’s number of close outsider peers, which is consistent with our hypothesis that the MIL 
prevents her DIL from accessing or forming outside networks. In all columns, the coefficient of 
the instrument is statistically significant at the one percent level and is of a similar magnitude; 
the F-statistic of the first stage is also above the standard threshold of 10 used in the literature 
(Staiger and Stock 1997), re-assuring us about the strength of our instrument. Our preferred 
specification is presented in column (6), where the interaction coefficient of -0.229 implies that 
for the average value of 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑣, which is 0.50, living with the MIL decreases a woman’s number 
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of close outside peers by 0.11. This translates into a 31 percent decline in a woman’s number of 
close outside peers, relative to an average woman who does not live with her MIL (who has 0.36 
close outside peers).  
To check if the relationship between 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑣 and the IV (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑣 ⋅ 𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑖) is 
monotonic, we estimated the non-parametric relationship between the two variables using the 
npregress command in STATA with the kernel option. As Figure 2 shows, the relationship is 
strongly monotonic for different kernels functions, estimators (local-linear and local-constant), 
and bandwidths. 
Table 10 presents the second-stage and reduced-form estimates from our IV analysis 
using our preferred definition of 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑣 (i.e., peer-pool of 18-30 married women). Among 
women who do not have any close outside peers in their village, the average likelihood of having 
visited a family planning clinic is 30 percent. The statistically significant 2SLS coefficient of 
0.664 in column (1) of Table 9 implies that if such women get just one close outside peer in their 
village, their average likelihood of visiting a family planning clinic would go up by 67 p.p. to 96 
percent. Moreover, consistent with our OLS results, column (2) shows that women who have 
more close outside peers in their village are more likely to use modern methods of contraception; 
although the point estimate is large, it is not statistically significant at conventional levels. The 
reduced form coefficients in Panel B of Table 10 validate the relevance condition of our 
instrument (Angrist and Pischke 2009). 
There are several channels through which peers may influence a woman’s family 
planning outcomes.27 First, a woman’s peers may accompany her to a family planning clinic, 
thereby enabling her to overcome the mobility constraints imposed on her by her MIL, and 
improving her access to reproductive health services. This is consistent with the OLS and IV 
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coefficients in columns (4) of Tables 7 and 10, respectively, which show that women who have 
more close outside peers in their village are more likely to be permitted to visit a health facility 
with someone. We term this the “companionship” channel. This mechanism is especially 
important in settings such as ours where women’s physical mobility is severely curtailed.  
Second, women who have more outside peers may be better informed about the true 
contraceptive prevalence rates in their villages, either because their peers provide this 
information directly or because they learn about it during their visits to the family planning 
clinics (“information” channel). If we assume that women who have limited interaction with 
individuals outside their homes underestimate family planning use in their communities, then 
having more close outside peers can correct their beliefs. Consistent with this information 
channel, the OLS and IV results in columns (3) of Tables 7 and 10, respectively, show that 
women who have more close outside peers in their village believe that more women in their 
village use family planning.28 Since our 2SLS specifications control for caste-by-village fixed 
effects, this result cannot be driven by women with more close outside peers living in villages 
with higher actual contraceptive prevalence. However, we cannot say how much closer the 
beliefs of our sample women are to the actual contraceptive prevalence rates in their villages 
because we do not have data on the latter.  
The omitted-variable bias in the OLS regressions of outcomes, such as the likelihood of 
visiting a family planning clinic, on the number of close outside peers is likely to be positive, 
which would suggest that our OLS estimates should be larger than the IV estimates. However, in 
our case, the opposite is true. This could be due to the fact that the IV estimates capture the local 
average treatment effect (LATE), which is the response for those women whose number of close 
outside peers is affected by the instrument (“compliers”), while the OLS captures the average 
Curse of the Mummy-ji 
 27 
effect of an additional close outside peer for the entire sample (Imbens and Angrist 1994). If 
compliers are women who face stronger mobility constraints due to co-residence with the MIL, 
they might benefit more from having outside peers than the average woman, explaining the 
larger magnitude of the IV coefficients.  
In order to characterize the compliers, we estimate our first-stage regression specification 
for various sub-samples (see Online Supplementary Appendix Table A.6). We do not observe 
any significant heterogeneity by age and years of schooling of the DIL. The first stage appears to 
be mainly driven by daughters-in-law whose husbands have been migrant, i.e., have been away 
from home for one month or more at a time, whose mothers-in-law disapprove of family 
planning, whose mothers-in-law’s ideal number of children for the DIL is greater than the DIL’s 
ideal number of children, and whose mothers-in-law want them to have more sons that the DIL 
already have. These patterns suggest that our LATE is based on women whose mothers-in-law 
have more conservative attitudes towards family planning, fertility, and son preference than they 
do and on women whose mothers-in-law are able to enforce these restrictions (e.g., due to the 
absence of the DIL’s husband, her son). 
Robustness Checks  
Next, we perform a series of tests to further establish that our IV approach identifies the 
causal effect of a woman’s close peers outside home on her family planning outcomes.  
 We have already demonstrated that women who live with the MIL are similar to women 
who do not live with the MIL along several dimensions; moreover, we flexibly control for 
variables such as woman’s age and education that differ across the two groups. As our IV 
specifications include fixed effects for caste category, village, village-by-caste category, and a 
vector of individual and household characteristics, the exclusion restriction will be violated only 
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if there are any remaining individual- or household-level differences between women belonging 
to the same caste-group and village but who differ in terms of living with the MIL. In column (1) 
of Online Supplementary Appendix Table A.7, we show that our IV results for visiting a family 
planning clinic in Table 9 are also robust to further controlling for the fertility preferences of the 
woman, of her husband, and of her MIL. In the next two columns, we show that our results hold 
even when we use the two alternate definitions of the pool. In column (4), we restrict our sample 
to villages that have at least 10 sample women; the results continue to hold.  
 Lastly, in Table 11, we conduct several placebo tests. If our IV interaction (Propcv*MIL) 
potentially identifies the effect of close outside peers on a woman’s health outcomes, we should 
not observe significant “effects” if we replace the outcomes with variables that are unrelated to our 
hypothesized channels. We examine four such placebo indicator outcomes—a woman’s firstborn-
child being a son, whether the woman’s household is involved in a land dispute, whether the 
woman’s mother attended school, and whether the woman father’s attended school. It is well-
established that the sex of a first child is as-good-as-random in India (Das Gupta and Bhat 1997; 
Visaria 2005; Bhalotra and Cochrane 2010; Anukriti, Bhalotra, and Tam 2016). Moreover, we do 
not expect that living with the MIL or having more close outside peers should impact the 
household’s probability of being involved in a land dispute or a woman’s parents’ school 
attendance in the past. Reassuringly, none of the second-stage or the reduced form coefficients in 
Table 11 are significantly different from zero.  
Policy Implications and Conclusion 
In traditional patrilocal societies, such as India, restrictive social norms and co-residence 
with the MIL are ubiquitous. Using primary data, we first characterize the social networks of 
young married women in rural Uttar Pradesh, and then analyze how inter-generational power 
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dynamics within the marital household influence women’s social network formation. We 
document that co-residence with the MIL is strongly negatively associated with her DIL’s 
mobility and ability to form close social connections outside the home. Using mediation analysis, 
we find that a DIL’s number of peers outside her home is a relevant channel through which MIL-
co-residence alters her family planning outcomes. Third, using an instrumental variable 
approach, we find that a woman’s social connections outside their home can improve her family 
planning outcomes.  
Although the social networks of our sample women are sparse, the benefits of having 
even a few close peers outside the household are substantial in terms of women’s health-seeking 
behavior. Our IV estimates suggest that women with a higher number of close peers outside their 
household are more likely to visit a family planning clinic and to use modern contraceptive 
methods. These outside connections positively influence a woman’s beliefs about family 
planning use in their community and help her overcome the mobility restrictions that are 
imposed by the MIL by accompanying her to the clinic. Future research should unpack other 
channels through which peers could potentially empower women such as by increasing their 
physical mobility, self-confidence, and aspirations. For instance, Field et al. (2016) provide 
suggestive evidence that greater freedom of movement and the ability to more freely form social 
connections can improve women’s aspirations. In addition, Kandpal and Baylis (2019) show that 
having more empowered peers increases a woman’s mobility in rural Uttarakhand, India. 
Although this article does not study a social-networks-based intervention, our results are 
informative for the design of policies that leverage social networks to increase women’s access 
and uptake of family planning and reproductive health services. First, recent empirical evidence 
shows that family planning interventions could be successful in increasing contraceptive use and 
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reducing unmet need by tapping into women’s social networks; however, these findings are 
obtained from settings where women’s social networks are dense and extended. 29 If women only 
have a few close peers, as is the case in our study setting, then it would be more challenging to 
reach them and to diffuse information or other policy interventions through their networks. This 
issue is even more relevant in contexts such as rural Uttar Pradesh, where there is a significant 
unmet need for family planning (18 percent) and where at-home reach of health workers is quite 
low—only 13 percent of health workers have ever talked to female non-users about family 
planning (Indian Institute of Population Sciences and Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 
2016), implying that a woman’s inability to access a family planning clinic effectively translates 
into no interaction with a family planning provider.  
Second, our results point out that the MIL might act as a gatekeeper for women’s social 
interactions and the potential benefits that networks provide their members. Thus, future 
interventions that aim to reach women would benefit from addressing the gatekeeper-role of the 
MIL into their targeting strategies, or by directly targeting the MIL in a joint family to inform her 
about the benefits of family planning and reproductive health services (Varghese and Roy 2019). 
These future policies should address the potential misalignment of fertility preferences and 
asymmetry of information and bargaining power between the MIL and DIL in a manner similar 
to the family planning interventions that have aimed to challenge the intra-household allocation 
issues between husbands and wives (Ashraf, 2014; McCarthy, 2019). Nevertheless, whether and 
what types of policies can counter the negative influence of the MIL and expand women’s 
networks remains to be explored.  
While our results are most relevant to north and northwest India, where sociocultural 
norms that restrict women’s autonomy are the strongest, our findings may also speak to other 
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settings where households extend beyond the nuclear family unit. Future work should extend our 
analysis to other Indian states and to other developing countries to identify potential 
heterogeneity in the characteristics of women’s social networks and in the influence of the MIL. 
For instance, Kumar et al. (2019) find that women’s self-help groups expand women’s social 
networks and improve their mobility in India. With this in mind, there is a need for further 
research that would inform policymakers on the relative importance of other household members 
in determining women’s autonomy and well-being, particularly in patrilocal societies like rural 
Uttar Pradesh, where extended households continue to remain prevalent.  
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Figure 2: Non-parametric relationship between ClosePeersicv and IV 
 
   
 
 
    
NOTES: These graphs plot the non-parametric relationship between a woman’s number of close outside peers in her 
village and our IV, (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑣 ⋅ 𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑖). In the top left figure, we use the Epanechnikov kernel function and a local-
linear estimator. In the top right figure, we use the Gaussian kernel function and a local-linear estimator. In the 
bottom left figure, we use the Epanechnikov kernel function and a local-constant estimator. The bottom right figure 
uses the Epanechnikov kernel function, a local-linear estimator, and improved AIC instead of cross-validation to 
compute optimal bandwidth.  
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Tables 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age  671 25.67 2.65 18 30 
Husband age  644 32.57 9.45 18 73 
SC 671 0.43 0.50 0 1 
ST 671 0.01 0.12 0 1 
OBC  671 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Upper caste 671 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Hindu  671 0.93 0.25 0 1 
Years of schooling  671 9.53 4.47 0 15 
Marriage duration (years) 655 7.31 3.61 0 21 
Age at marriage  655 18.36 2.52 6 28 
Live with MIL  671 0.68 0.47 0 1 
Own land  638 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Amount of land owned (acres) 671 5.43 2.72 1 26 
No. of living sons  671 0.96 0.76 0 4 
No. of living children  671 1.95 0.92 1 5 
Firstborn is a son 671 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Allowed to visit alone:      
Home of relatives/ friends 671 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Health facility  671 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Grocery store  671 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Short distance train/ bus 671 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Market  671 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Outside village/ community 671 0.21 0.40 0 1 
Wears ghunghat/ purdah 671 0.88 0.32 0 1 
Worked in the last 7 days 666 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Using modern contraception 670 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Has visited family planning 
clinic 671 0.35 0.48 
0 1 
 
NOTES: This table describes the characteristics of our sample. Columns (1)-(5) report, respectively, the number of 
observations, the mean, and the standard deviation, the minimum, and the maximum value for each variable. SC, ST, 
and OBC denote, respectively Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, and Other Backward Class. 
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Table 2: Influence of the MIL on DIL's number of peers, OLS 
 
 Co-residence with: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
A. Outcome: # close peers in the village 
Mother-in-law -0.120** -0.114* -0.117** -0.128** -0.129** 
 
[0.045] [0.062] [0.050] [0.049] [0.053] 
Father-in-law 
 
-0.0004 -0.020 -0.010 -0.011 
  
[0.056] [0.041] [0.039] [0.039] 




   
[0.029] 
  # other 18-30 women  
   
0.079** 
 
    
[0.033] 
 # other 18-30 married women  
    
0.129*** 
     
[0.039] 
Control mean 0.606 0.606 0.606 0.606 0.606 
 
B. Outcome: # close outside peers in the village 
Mother-in-law -0.133*** -0.138** -0.137*** -0.133*** -0.134*** 
 
[0.035] [0.053] [0.044] [0.044] [0.045] 
Father-in-law 
 
0.003 0.010 0.007 0.005 
  
[0.048] [0.045] [0.045] [0.044] 




   
[0.016] 
  # other 18-30 women  
   
-0.032 
 
    
[0.020] 
 # other 18-30 married women  
    
-0.035 
     
[0.023] 
Control mean 0.361 0.361 0.361 0.361 0.361 
N 671 653 653 653 653 
 
NOTES: This table reports coefficients from specification (1). Each column is a separate OLS regression. The 
outcome variables in panels A and B are the DIL's number of close peers in the same village and the number of close 
peers that are not household members, respectively. In all cases, we control for the DIL's age, years of schooling, 
Hindu dummy, amount of land owned by the household, and fixed effects for her caste category (SC-ST, OBC, or 
Other caste) and village. In addition, we gradually add an indicator for residence with the FIL, the number of other 
women in the HH that are above 18, in the 18-30 age group, and in the married 18-30 group, as controls across 
columns. Control mean refers to the dependent variable mean for women who do not live with their MIL. Robust 
standard errors in brackets are clustered by village. *** 𝑝 < 0.01, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, * 𝑝 < 0.1. 
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Table 3: Influence of the MIL on DIL's mobility, OLS regressions 
 
 















purdah   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Lives with MIL -0.096** -0.134*** -0.157*** -0.043* -0.167*** -0.083*** 0.064*** 
  [0.036] [0.037] [0.038] [0.021] [0.035] [0.026] [0.019] 
N 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 
Control Mean  0.218 0.255 0.310 0.125 0.329 0.296 0.838 
 
NOTES: This table reports coefficients from specification (1). Each column is a separate regression. The outcome variables are indicators that equal one if the DIL 
is usually allowed to visit the respective places alone. In all cases, we control for the DIL's age, years of schooling, Hindu dummy, amount of land owned by the 
household, and fixed effects for her caste category (SC-ST, OBC, or Other caste) and village. Control mean refers to the dependent variable mean for women who 
do not live with their MIL. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered by village.  *** 𝑝 < 0.01, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, * 𝑝 < 0.1. 








Live with MIL = 0 Live with MIL = 1 Difference 
Variables: N Mean N Mean (2)-(4) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age 216 26.38 455 25.336 1.043*** 
Husband age 211 31.938 433 32.875 -0.937 
Marriage Duration 210 8.595 445 6.697 1.899*** 
Years of schooling 216 8.102 455 10.207 -2.105*** 
Spousal schooling gap 211 0.275 432 -0.155 0.430 
SC  216 0.472 455 0.429 0.044 
ST 216 0.014 455 0.033 -0.019 
OBC  216 0.454 455 0.431 0.023 
Hindu 216 0.926 455 0.938 -0.013 
Amount of land owned (acres) 216 5.374 455 5.460 -0.085 
Employed 213 0.131 453 0.146 -0.014 
No. of living sons 216 1.028 455 0.925 0.103 
      
NOTES: This table compares the average characteristics of women who do not live with the MIL (columns (1)-(2)) 
and women who do (columns (3)-(4)). Column (5) reports the difference in the sample mean for the two groups. SC, 
ST, and OBC denote, respectively Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, and Other Backward Class. *** 𝑝 < 0.01, ** 𝑝 <






















Table 5: Influence of the MIL on DIL's mobility if FIL is co-resident, OLS regressions 
 




















# Close outside peers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Sample restriction: FIL co-resident 
MIL -0.234*** -0.134** -0.098** -0.131*** -0.054 -0.168** -0.091 0.020 
 
[0.081] [0.059] [0.045] [0.047] [0.042] [0.061] [0.060] [0.036] 
N 406 406 406 406 406 406 406 406 
Control mean 0.422 0.234 0.203 0.250 0.109 0.312 0.436 0.891 
 
NOTES: This table reports coefficients from specification (1). Each column is a separate regression. The outcome variables are the same as those in Tables 2 and 3. 
The sample is restricted to households where the father-in-law (FIL) is co-resident. In all cases, we control for the DIL's age, years of schooling, Hindu dummy, 
amount of land owned by the household, and fixed effects for her caste category (SC-ST, OBC, or Other caste) and village. Control mean refers to the dependent 
variable mean for women who have a co-resident FIL but who do not live with their MIL. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered by village. *** 𝑝 < 0.01, 
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Table 6: Heterogeneity in the influence of the MIL on DIL's number of peers, by MIL’s fertility preferences, OLS regressions 
 









> Ideal KidsDIL 
Ideal KidsMIL 
<= Ideal KidsDIL 
Ideal SonsMIL > 
DIL’s sons 
Ideal SonsMIL <= 
DIL sons 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lives with MIL -0.160** -0.115* -0.117** 0.0003 -0.127** 0.074 
  [0.061] [0.060] [0.045] [0.145] [0.052] [0.144] 
Control Mean 0.556 0.691 0.572 0.744 0.573 0.733 
 B. Outcome: # close outside peers in the village 
Lives with MIL -0.149*** -0.119* -0.103** -0.169 -0.098** -0.164 
  [0.041] [0.064] [0.041] [0.125] [0.043] [0.134] 
Control Mean 0.348 0.383 0.329 0.488 0.316 0.533 
N 320 351 519 152 530 141 
 
NOTES: This table reports coefficients from specification (1). Each column within a panel is a separate regression. The outcome variable is the number of close 
peers a woman has in her village in Panel A and the number of such peers outside the household in Panel B. Columns (1) and (2) split the sample by whether the 
MIL approves of using FP or not. Columns (3) and (4) compare the number of children the MIL would like the DIL to have (Ideal KidsMIL) and the DIL’s ideal 
number of children (Ideal KidsDIL). Columns (5) and (6) compare the number of sons the MIL would like the DIL to have (Ideal SonsMIL) and the DIL’s number 
of sons at the time of the survey (DIL sons). In all cases, we control for the DIL's age, years of schooling, Hindu dummy, amount of land owned by the 
household, and fixed effects for her caste category (SC-ST, OBC, or Other caste) and village. Control mean refers to the dependent variable mean for women 
who do not live with their MIL. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered by village. *** 𝑝 < 0.01, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, * 𝑝 < 0.1. 
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Beliefs about FP 
use in village 
Allowed to visit health 
facility with someone 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
# close outside peers 0.130** 0.067 0.233 0.024*** 
 
[0.054] [0.039] [0.188] [0.008] 
N 671 670 671 671 
Control mean 0.303 0.164 2.295 0.971 
 
NOTES: This table reports coefficients from specification (1). Each column is a separate regression. The key explanatory variable is a woman’s number of close 
peers who live in her village but not in her household. The outcome variables are: an indicator for whether a woman has visited a health facility for reproductive 
health, fertility, or family planning services in column (1); an indicator for whether a woman is using a modern method of contraception at the time of survey in 
column (2); a categorical variable that takes values 0 to 6 with higher values indicating a woman’s belief that more women in her village use family planning in 
column (3); and an indicator for whether a woman is usually allowed to visit a health facility with someone in column (4). In all cases, we control for the DIL's age, 
years of schooling, Hindu dummy, amount of land owned by the household, and fixed effects for her caste category (SC-ST, OBC, or Other caste) and village. 
Control mean refers to the dependent variable mean for women who do not have a close outside peer in their village. Robust standard errors in brackets are 
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Table 8: Mediation analysis 










 (5) - (4) 




A. Has visited FP clinic 



















 p-value: (3) vs (1) 
 
0.0002 
   
0.0002 
 
B. Uses modern method 





















 p-value: (3) vs (1) 
 
0.0009 
   
0.0006 
 
C. Beliefs about FP use in village 




















 p-value: (3) vs (1) 
 
0.0002 
   
0.0002 
 
D. Allowed to visit health facility with someone 




















 p-value: (3) vs (1) 
 
0.0002 
   
0.0002 
 
NOTES: The p-values test if the estimates of ACDE from sequential g-estimation are significantly different from the estimated ATE. In columns (4) and (5), the 
specification includes Caste x Village FE. Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the village level and in parentheses are bootstrapped. *** 𝑝 < 0.01, ** 𝑝 <
0.05, * 𝑝 < 0.1. 
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Table 9: First-stage results from 2SLS regressions 
 




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑣 ∗ 𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑖  -0.256*** -0.214*** -0.261*** -0.232*** -0.260*** -0.229*** 
 













 N 671 671 671 671 671 671 




























NOTES: This table reports coefficients from two versions of specification (5); in columns (1), (3), and (5), we only include 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑣 ∗ 𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑖 and  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑣 as explanatory variables, while the rest of the columns estimate the full version of specification (5). Each column is a separate regression. The outcome 
variable is a woman’s number of close peers who live in her village but not in her household. Across columns, we use the three definitions of the peer-pool 





Curse of the Mummy-ji 
 53 






Beliefs about FP 
use in village 
Allowed to visit health 
facility with someone 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Second stage 
    # close outside peers 0.664* 0.111 2.607*** 0.103 
 
[0.345] [0.350] [0.966] [0.072] 
B. Reduced form 
    𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑣 ∗ 𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑖 -0.152* -0.024 -0.596* -0.024 
 
[0.083] [0.082] [0.321] [0.017] 
N 671 670 671 671 
 
NOTES: This table reports coefficients from specification (6) in Panel A and the reduced form estimates for our IV estimation in Panel B. Each coefficient is from 
a separate regression. The outcome variables are: an indicator for whether a woman has ever-visited a health facility for reproductive health, fertility, or family 
planning services in column (1); an indicator for whether a woman is using a modern method of contraception at the time of survey in column (2); a categorical 
variable that takes values 0 to 6 with higher values indicating a woman’s belief that more women in her village use family planning in column (3); and an indicator 
for whether a woman is usually allowed to visit a health facility with someone in column (4). Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the village level. 
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Table 11: Placebo tests 
 
Firstborn is a son Involved in land dispute Mother attended school Father attended school 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Second stage 
    # close outside peers -0.204 -0.038 0.320 -0.489 
 
[0.353] [0.182] [0.304] [0.308] 
B. Reduced form 
    𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑣 ∗ 𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑖 0.047 0.009 -0.073 0.112 
 
[0.083] [0.045] [0.075] [0.075] 
N 451 671 671 671 
 
NOTES: This table reports coefficients from specification (6) in Panel A and the reduced form estimates for our IV estimation in Panel B. Each column is a 
separate regression. The outcome variables are indicators that equal one if the firstborn child of the woman is a son in column (1), if her household is involved in a 
land dispute in column (2), if her mother attended school in column (3), and if her father attended school in column (4). Robust standard errors in brackets are 
clustered at the village level. *** 𝑝 < 0.01, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, * 𝑝 < 0.1. 
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1 With an estimated population of 200 million people in 2012, Uttar Pradesh would be the 
world’s fifth most populated country by itself. 
2 Patrilocality refers to the practice of a married couple residing with or near the husband’s 
parents. Patrilineality is a kinship system in which an individual’s family membership derives 
from the father's lineage. 
3 Other prominent studies on this topic include Merrill 2007; Simkhada et al. 2008; Char, 
Saavala, and Kulmala 2010; Shih and Pyke 2010; and Gangoli and Rew 2011.  
4 Empirical evidence has extensively shown that in contexts where formal sources of information 
are missing, peers can play an important role in disseminating information about new health 
technologies (H. P. Kohler, Behrman, and Watkins 2001; Miguel and Kremer 2004; Godlonton 
and Thornton 2012), including family planning ( H.-P. Kohler, Behrman, and Watkins 2000, 
2002; Behrman, Kohler, and Watkins 2002), employment opportunities (Munshi and 
Rosenzweig 2006), and agricultural technologies (Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Conley and 
Udry 2010; Magnan et al. 2015), among other issues in developing countries (for a review, see 
Breza 2016).  
5 Unlike other correlational studies on this topic, Varghese and Roy (2019) estimate the causal 
impacts of co-residence with the MIL on health during pregnancy. 
6 Ethical approval to conduct the trial and all related study activities was received from the 
Northeastern University Institutional Review Board (protocol number 18-04-24) and from the 
University of Delhi Research Council. An informed consent form to participate in the study was 
provided to each woman that we contacted and only women who consented were recruited into 
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the study. The trial was also registered at the American Economic Association Registry for 
randomized controlled trials on September 16, 2018 (AEARCTR-0003283). 
7 Since we are interested in the MIL’s influence on women’s social networks, the relevant group 
for this article is the population of married women. Our sample-selection criteria mean that two 
types of married women are missing from our analysis: those who had no children and those who 
were older than 30 at the time of our baseline survey. The direction in which the omission of 
these two groups could bias our results is, a priori, unclear. On the one hand, childless married 
women are likely to have moved into their marital villages more recently than our sample 
women, and may, therefore, have fewer close outside peers and weaker bargaining power with 
respect to the MIL. On the other hand, women who are older than 30 are likely to have resided in 
their villages for a longer duration and, hence, may have more peers and greater bargaining 
power with respect to the MIL, in comparison to our sample women.  
8 Specifically, close peers are individuals who are mentioned by the woman in response to the 
following question: “I would like to ask about the list of people, different from your husband and 
mother-in-law, with whom you talk about family planning, fertility, and reproductive matters and 
whose opinions are important to you. They are the people with whom you discuss your personal 
affairs or private concerns related to family planning, pregnancy, childbearing, and health.” 
9 Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2011) show that a large downward bias can result when top-coding 
is used to sample peer networks. However, in our survey, all participants reported fewer than five 
close peers, besides their husband and MIL; in fact, the modal woman listed only one close peer. 
Thus, five appears to be an effective upper limit on network size in our sample. 
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10 We did not collect such information about general peers since the primary focus of our 
experiment was on women’s health, fertility, and family planning related networks.  
11 The average number of close peers in the village among women who have at least one such 
peer is 1.14. 
12 Although the estimates in Kandpal and Baylis (2019) are larger than ours, we note that our 
sample is younger and that Uttar Pradesh is a more conservative state relative to Uttarakhand, 
especially in terms of gender norms. 
13 In our baseline data, all social network information about the peers is self-reported by the 
surveyed woman, and we are unable to construct the reciprocal links between women and their 
close peers, except for a few cases where the close peers turned out to be a part of our sample. It 
is plausible that these “out-degree” measures of social ties are less reliable as they cannot be 
corroborated by the “in-degree” measures, i.e., where others report having a link with the 
individual in question. Thus, it is worth noting that the variables used to characterize the close 
peers might induce some bias in our network depiction.  
14 One concern with the inclusion of household landholdings as a control in specification (1) is 
that co-residence with the MIL may alter the amount of land the DIL’s sub-family owns. 
Therefore, in the Online Supplementary Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2 we show that the 𝛽 
estimates from specification (1) are robust to the exclusion of the landholding variable. 
Nevertheless, we retain landownership as a control in our main tables as a proxy to control for a 
woman’s household economic status, which is likely to be a relevant determinant of her access to 
health services. Ideally, we would like to control for economic status using a covariate that is 
entirely independent of co-residence with MIL; however, we lack such data in our survey.  
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15 We do not make a causal claim here as the number of close peers in the household may be 
simultaneously determined with the number of close peers outside the household. 
16 The influence of other adult women in the household becomes somewhat more restrictive 
when the MIL is absent from the household. This suggests that adult females-in-law in the 
household (e.g., older sisters-in-law) may become substitutes for the MIL upon her departure 
from the household as the enforcers of mobility restrictions on the younger DIL. Nevertheless, 
the negative influence of these adult females-in-law on the DIL’s number of close peers in the 
absence of the MIL is smaller than that of the MIL when she is present, implying that they are 
imperfect substitutes for the MIL.  
17 The mobility index is the sum of the six indicator variables used in columns (1)-(6) of Table 3. 
The autonomy index is the sum of two indicator variables that equal one if the DIL has a say in 
decisions about her healthcare and about her visits to family or relatives.  
18 We consider the area of landholdings as a post-treatment variable since co-residence with their 
MIL may influence the amount of land that the household owns.  
19 We cannot estimate bootstrapped errors for columns (4)-(5) that control for caste-by-village 
fixed effects because we lack enough degrees of freedom due to our small sample size. 
20 To assess the sensitivity of our estimates to the assumptions that we make about the pathways 
in Figure 1, we also estimated the ACDE under the “no intermediate confounders” assumption—
the estimates are similar to those obtained after accounting for intermediate confounders using 
sequential g-estimation. Results are available upon request.  
21  Following Acharya et al. (2016), the ACDE is identified under the following assumptions. 
First, conditional on pre-treatment covariates, there are not omitted variables for the effect of 
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MIL-co-residence on the outcomes and no omitted variables for the effect of 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 on the 
outcome, conditional on MIL-co-residence, pre-treatment covariates and intermediate 
confounders. Second, the effect of 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 on the outcomes is independent of the 
intermediate confounders. 
22 We divide the sample into three distinct caste groups: scheduled castes or tribes (SC-ST), 
OBC, and upper castes. As previously mentioned, 44 percent of the sample is OBC, 11 percent 
belongs to an upper caste, and the rest are SC-ST, with the ST share being negligible (1.5 
percent).   
23 Given the potential influence of co-residence with the MIL on the household’s landholdings, 
we show in Online Supplementary Appendix Table A.4 that our IV results are robust to the 
exclusion of this variable. 
24 Our use of Propcv as a proxy for a woman’s potential local peer group is motivated by the 
work of Luke and Munshi (2006) who use a similar proxy to define a man’s available pool of 
brides in his marriage market. In their context, marriage is clan-based and exogamous (i.e., a 
man must marry outside his own ethnic clan or any related ethnic clan); so the authors create a 
concentration measure of local clan relatedness as an instrument for marriage in a location—if a 
higher fraction of clans in a marriage market are related to a man’s own clan, then his pool of 
eligible brides is smaller, and so on.  











1830 respectively denote the total number of 18-30-year-old women in the village and the 
number of such women who belong to the caste-group c, while 𝑁𝑣 and 𝑁𝑐𝑣 respectively denote 
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the total number of women in the village and the total number of women who belong to caste-
group c in the village. 
26 Our use of co-residence with the MIL as a proxy for a woman’s access to her network is 
motivated by Posades and Vidal-Fernandez (2013), Debnath (2015), and Dhanaraj and 
Mahambare (2019) who employ a range of family structure-based instruments (e.g., death of the 
woman’s father-in-law, co-residence with the father-in-law, co-residence with other matriarchal 
figures (grandmothers), and joint family residence) as proxies for women’s access, mobility, 
potential for employment outside the home, and empowerment. 
27 While the influence of peers on women’s family planning outcomes is likely to differ by peers’ 
beliefs and attitudes towards family planning as well as other observable characteristics, we are 
unable to robustly conduct heterogeneity analysis due to our relatively small sample. Moreover, 
peer characteristics are unlikely to be exogenous and peer influence is likely to be bi-
directional—for instance, almost 79 percent of peers have both given family planning advice to 
and received family planning advice from our sample women. 
28 The outcome variable is a categorical variable that takes values 0 to 6 with higher values 
indicating a woman’s belief that more women in her village use family planning. 
29 Most of these interventions take place in Sub-Saharan Africa (Colleran and Mace, 2015; 
Institute of Reproductive Health, 2019). 
